Clockwork Automata, Artificial Intelligence, and Why the Body of the Author Matters by Crosthwaite, Paul
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clockwork Automata, Artificial Intelligence, and Why the Body of
the Author Matters
Citation for published version:
Crosthwaite, P 2011, Clockwork Automata, Artificial Intelligence, and Why the Body of the Author Matters. in
D Coleman & H Fraser (eds), Minds, Bodies, Machines, 1770-1930. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 84-103.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Minds, Bodies, Machines, 1770-1930
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Crosthwaite, P. (2011). Clockwork Automata, Artificial Intelligence, and Why the Body of the Author Matters.
In D. Coleman, & H. Fraser (Eds.), Minds, Bodies, Machines, 1770-1930. (pp. 84-103). Palgrave Macmillan.
reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.
This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published,
version of record is available here: http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/minds-bodies-machines-17701930-
deirdre-coleman/?K=9780230284678.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Crosthwaite, P 2011, 'Clockwork Automata, Artificial Intelligence, and Why the Body of the Author Matters'. in 
D Coleman & H Fraser (eds), Minds, Bodies, Machines, 1770-1930. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 84-103. 
 
4. Clockwork Automata, Artificial Intelligence, and Why the Body of the Author 
Matters 
 
Paul Crosthwaite 
 
On 9 June 1949, Geoffrey Jefferson, Professor of Neurosurgery at the University of 
Manchester, marked his receipt of the prestigious Lister Medal from the Royal 
College of Surgeons by addressing the College’s members on the topic of ‘The Mind 
of Mechanical Man’. Jefferson summarized his assessment of the prospects for 
mechanical consciousness with these words: 
 
Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of 
thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we 
agree that machine equals brain – that is, not only write it but know that it had 
written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy 
contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by 
flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or 
depressed when it cannot get what it wants.
i
  
 
This passage articulates a set of principles that would come to guide much of the 
research in the fields that we now know as artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life 
(AL): that there is a fundamental difference between the mere rote processing of data 
and the self-conscious awareness and understanding of what is being processed; that 
authentic consciousness is coloured by shifting emotional, affective, and libidinal 
states; and that this rich psychic reality finds its privileged expression in acts of 
artistic creation. This essay explores how these conceptions have been channelled into 
attempts to design computer programmes capable of producing original works of 
literature. It does so, however, by drawing parallels between recent research by 
computer scientists into the possibility of constructing artificial authors and the 
elaborate clockwork writing automata produced by European craftsmen in the late 
eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries. Building on the work of Jessica Riskin and 
others, I suggest that for all their comparative lack of sophistication, the clockwork 
writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries anticipate – by virtue of their 
embodiment in articulated, humanoid form – an emerging paradigm in the field of 
artificial intelligence that presents tantalizing possibilities for the development of 
machine creativity. This new research agenda has, in turn, surprising and profound 
consequences for literary criticism and theory today. 
 
Writing Automata and Romantic Authorship 
 
Between 1768 and 1844, the Swiss watchmakers Pierre and Henri-Louis Jaquet-Droz 
and Jean-Frédéric Leschot, the Jaquet-Droz’s protégé Henri Maillardet, and the 
French illusionist Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin constructed a series of startlingly 
lifelike writer-figures (figures 1-4). 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Left to right: ‘The Draftsman’, ‘The Musician’, and ‘The Writer’ (constructed 1768-1774) 
by Pierre and Henri-Louis Jaquet-Droz and Jean-Frédéric Leschot. Photograph by Rama, Wikimedia 
Commons, Cc-by-sa-2.0-fr. 
 
 FIGURE 2. ‘The Writer’ by Pierre and Henri-Louis Jaquet-Droz and Jean-Frédéric Leschot. 
Photograph by Rama, Wikimedia Commons, Cc-by-sa-2.0-fr. 
 
 FIGURE 3. Writer-Draughtsman (1805) by Henri Maillardet. From the Historical and Interpretive 
Collections of The Franklin Institute, Inc., Philadelphia, PA. 
 
 FIGURE 4. Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin with his Writer-Draughtsman (1844; destroyed by fire 1865?) 
in background. Arts Collection, State Library of Victoria, Australia. 
 
Seated at their desks and equipped with quills, they astounded viewers by inscribing 
documents set before them with signatures or short poems. The texts to be written by 
the Jaquet-Droz and Maillardet devices were ‘coded’ by selecting letters on a wheel 
and/or by setting a series of cams. Turned by clockwork motors, these components 
drove complex systems of levers and rods, which guided the movements of the 
figures’ hands over the page. Robert-Houdin’s writer is thought to have been 
destroyed by a fire in 1865, and so has not been subjected to expert examination, but 
it seems likely that, in common with other automata built by the great illusionist, it 
would have combined elements of the sophisticated mechanisms utilized by the 
Jaquet-Drozes and Maillardet with hidden levers or pedals controlled by a human 
operator.
ii
 Jessica Riskin locates this difference in the construction of these automata 
in the context of a shift from an eighteenth-century ethos of simulation (which sought 
to replicate, as accurately as possible, the mechanics of physiological processes 
themselves) to a nineteenth-century culture of analogy (which was content with 
devices that merely presented an outward semblance of such underlying processes).
iii
 
As Riskin acknowledges, however, even the device she identifies as the principal 
embodiment of the philosophy of simulation – Jacques Vaucanson’s digesting duck 
(first exhibited 1738) – employed a crude fraud, rather than the elaborate 
technological architecture proclaimed by its maker, to achieve its effects (a fraud 
which was eventually revealed by none other than Robert-Houdin).
iv
 Without 
discarding Riskin’s distinction between simulation and analogy, then, it is nonetheless 
evident that throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, automaton-
makers were united in manipulating the outwardly visible form and function of their 
machines in order to effect an illusion of interior organic process, irrespective, to 
some degree at least, of the actual process employed. In the case of the writing 
automata of the period, the intended illusion, of course, was the uncanny impression 
that the figures were not simply rehearsing a series of predetermined actions, but 
independently generating their own writings. Self-evidently, moreover, this illusion 
was reliant on the convincingly humanoid appearance and behaviour of the writers, 
while it would have been dispelled by the exposure of the mechanism (of whatever 
kind) propelling their motions. As a character in E.T.A Hoffmann’s ‘Die Automaten’ 
(1821) says of an automaton he has observed: ‘The outward form … [of the figure] 
has been cleverly selected. Its shape, appearance, and movements are well adapted to 
occupy our attention in such a manner that its secrets are preserved and to give us a 
favourable opinion of the intelligence which gives the answers’.v The impression of 
autonomous agency thus conveyed could be quite profound. John Tresch has recently 
charted the varied and ambiguous responses that such devices elicited when they were 
displayed to the public in theatres and exhibition halls. While some, generally more 
educated, viewers approached them as amusing novelties or impressive displays of 
technical ingenuity, others were willing to entertain the notion that they possessed 
some genuine flash of vitality.
vi
 It is striking, though, that in accounts of public 
displays of these figures, even the most sober witnesses testify to at least a fleeting 
illusion of spontaneous creativity. As I have suggested, this effect was dependent on 
the machines’ status as androids (humanoid automata) with anatomically 
proportionate physiques and naturalistic physiognomies; and this was for two reasons, 
both of which bear on prevailing models of subjectivity and authorship in the period. 
 Much discussion surrounds the cultural, philosophical, and aesthetic meanings 
and associations of these and other, contemporaneous, automata. Simon Schaffer, for 
example, identifies them as literal embodiments of a tradition of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century European thought that viewed humans as purely mechanical 
beings, a tradition whose origins lie in René Descartes’ philosophy of animal 
existence, and which, in extending Descartes’ claims to humans, reached its 
culmination in the French Enlightenment materialist ideas of Denis Diderot and, pre-
eminently, Julian Offray de La Mettrie. Its definitive statement is La Mettrie’s 1747 
treatise Machine Man, with its conclusion that ‘man is a machine and … there is in 
the whole universe only one diversely modified substance’.vii As Riskin emphasizes, 
though, even the most mechanistic of French Enlightenment philosophies found no 
contradiction in celebrating humanity’s capacity for ‘sentiment’ and ‘sensibility’ – for 
feeling, emotion, passion, and expression;
viii
 the attempts of automaton-makers to 
employ mechanical means in order to build figures that exhibited all the animation 
and vitality of human beings was, she suggests, wholly consistent with this outlook. 
The importance of a language of sentiment and sensibility throughout the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries is, furthermore, just one of many continuities that have 
led critics and cultural historians to question conventional divisions between 
Enlightenment and Romantic world-views.
ix
 Over a period exactly contemporaneous 
with the production of the clockwork writers discussed above, this tradition 
effloresced into the Romantic discourse of authorship, with its vision of literature as 
‘fundamentally expressive of a unique individuality’ and defined by ‘originality’ and 
the ‘conscious intention of the autonomous subject’.x Just as Romanticism privileged 
the expressive capacity of the writer, so, as Christopher Keep argues, the ability of an 
automaton to write suggests, more strongly than any other function it might possess,  
 
the presence not of a program but of a person, one whose actions are the free 
and spontaneous expressions of some deep reserve of selfhood, an inwardness 
or depth of being which is capable of reflecting on itself as self. The very 
appearance of writing … is always marked by the trace or outline of a living 
presence, the unique individual who is both the source and origin of the 
enunciative act.
xi
  
 
Vivian Sobchack also interprets these machines, like similar devices now marketed as 
children’s toys, as dramatizing a Romantic conception of authorship through the act 
of writing – specifically through the act of writing by hand. Handwriting, she 
remarks, ‘is always … auratic insofar as it is enabled not just by a material body but 
by a lived body that, however regulated, cannot avoid inscribing its singular 
intentionality in acts and marks of expressive improvisation’.xii 
The author of Romantic theory is a notoriously contradictory being, however, 
and if the convincingly anthropomorphous performances of these mechanical writer-
figures partake of an expressivist or idealist vision of literary creativity, in which the 
imagination is granted an autopoietic status, they equally resonate with an empiricist 
model that stresses the writer’s constitutive receptivity to the dynamics of the external 
world. As Riskin notes, the automaton-makers of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries did not attempt to replicate the action of the five senses;
xiii
 again, though, the 
verisimilar appearance of their machines succeeded in conveying to viewers an 
impression of responsiveness and alertness. In the case of the Jaquet-Drozes, even the 
choice of the figure’s footwear (or lack of it) was designed to suggest an acute 
sensitivity to the environment (see figure 1). As Gaby Wood puts it, 
 
some inventors intended their objects to be artificial forms of an eighteenth-
century ideal – the child as a blank slate, the purest being. The Jaquet-Droz 
figures conduct their marvellous activities barefoot, illustrating a belief, held by 
their contemporary Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that children would learn more 
freely if unhampered by shoes.
xiv
  
 
As has often been noted, the exemplary synthesis of the expressivist-idealist and 
empiricist currents in Romantic aesthetics is found in William Wordsworth’s ‘Tintern 
Abbey’ (1798).xv Wordsworth had no enthusiasm for automata,xvi but his exultant 
celebration of ‘all the mighty world / Of eye and ear, both what they half-create, / 
And what perceive’ (106-08) precisely delineates the spectrum of faculties that the 
clockwork writers of his day were designed to give the impression of possessing. I 
will return to Wordsworth’s poem later, in light of the connections I now wish to 
draw between these writer-figures and some recent developments in artificial 
intelligence research. If, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
writing automaton’s humanoid and (partially) mobile construction was technically 
incidental, and served merely to generate an illusion of sentience and perception, in 
our own era such material embodiment is increasingly viewed as essential to the 
creation of genuine artificial intelligence. 
 
Meaning and Embodiment in Machine-Generated Literature 
 
In November 1928, the Franklin Museum in Philadelphia took delivery of the 
damaged and disassembled components of a brass clockwork machine. The donors, in 
whose family the device had resided for several generations, understood it to have 
once been capable of writing messages and drawing pictures, and had some notion of 
it being the work of the German inventor Johann Nepomuk Maelzel. After an 
engineer at the Institute had painstakingly repaired the device, it was equipped with a 
fountain pen and set in motion. It promptly inscribed four drawings and three poems, 
signing the last with the flourish, ‘Ecrit par L’Automate de Maillardet’.xvii This 
wonderfully eerie story – a signal manifestation of that effect we have come to call 
the uncanny – perfectly allegorizes the historical dynamic I wish to explore, in which 
the fidelity of later generations to the embodied form of early clockwork automata 
permits those figures to address us, with arresting directness, across the centuries. 
 Riskin notes that the conviction in this earlier moment ‘that life, 
consciousness, and thought were essentially embodied in animal and human 
machinery has striking parallels in current Artificial Intelligence’.xviii As she observes, 
the notion that intelligence must be ‘physically grounded’ is the central principle of 
the sub-discipline of AI known as artificial life (AL). She cites the pioneering work of 
Rodney Brooks, director of the Artificial Intelligence Lab at MIT, who ‘has left 
behind the purely software model of AI, and instead builds robots with sensors and 
feedback loops, giving them vision, hearing, and touch’.xix The idea that, as Susan 
Blackmore puts it, ‘mind can be created only by interacting in real time with a real 
environment’ is of particular significance in the branches of AI that attempt to equip 
machines with a grasp of language.
xx
 Perhaps the most significant challenge to 
conventional, box-bound AI programmes in this regard is the argument – made, most 
influentially, by the philosopher of mind John Searle – that such systems will never 
possess genuine linguistic ability because they are condemned to an existence that 
lacks ‘intentionality’; that is, while they may be able to follow (and even, with the 
advent in the 1980s of artificial neural networks, progressively learn or internalize) 
syntactic rules, they can have no understanding of what the symbols they manipulate 
according to these rules are ‘about’, what they signify or refer to, what they mean. 
The ‘bottom-up’ approach advocated by proponents of ‘embodied cognition’ seeks to 
redress the problem of intentionality by more closely replicating the processes of 
human language acquisition: 
 
As human infants develop linguistic competence, they learn not only how to 
describe objects but also how to describe and express intentional relations such 
as wants, likes, and dislikes, intentional relations that were experienced by the 
infant before they could be cast in linguistic form. In this way language and 
cognition elaborate on previously experienced nonlinguistic and noncognitive 
(i.e., bodily) intentional relationships. An infant’s experiences of noncognitive 
intentional relationships provide the foundation necessary for the cognitive life 
it will later enjoy. Human beings do not suffer from the symbol grounding 
problem … precisely because we are embodied…. 
By building robots that interact with the environment prior to linguistic 
competence … an embodied approach to AI provides the necessary foundation 
for higher cognition.
xxi
  
 
 This new paradigm has not so far been extended into the domain of machine-
generated literature. The potential of embodied cognition for this field can be most 
readily grasped, however, by considering the software-based systems that currently 
exist. I will focus on the two most prominent examples: the Cybernetic Poet designed 
by the American inventor Ray Kurzweil, and BRUTUS, a short story-writing 
programme developed by Selmer Bringsjord, David Ferrucci, and a team of computer 
scientists at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in New York State. Given their 
significance for questions of authorship and textual meaning, and the considerable 
scholarly interest in other forms of electronic literature such as hypertext and 
interactive fiction, these projects have received remarkably little attention in literary 
studies.
xxii
 
Kurzweil’s Cybernetic Poet works by ‘reading’ – as its inventor puts it – 
poems by an author or authors and constructing a model of their work. The 
programme develops algorithms that allow it to imitate the style, metre, poetic 
structure, and vocabulary characteristic of the author(s). Kurzweil states that the 
resulting ‘poems are in a similar style to the author(s) originally analyzed but are 
completely original new poetry’.xxiii The following are examples of poems generated 
by Kurzweil’s programme, which can be accessed on his web site: 
 
Soul 
A haiku written after reading poems by John Keats and Wendy Dennis 
 
You broke my soul 
the juice of eternity, 
the spirit of my lips. 
 
And Pink In Sex 
A haiku written after reading poems by Walt Whitman 
 
Ages and pink in Sex, 
Offspring of the 
voices of all my Body. 
 
Bringsjord and Ferrucci’s BRUTUS produces short stories of up to 500 words 
using a sophisticated ‘story grammar’ architecture, which can handle character, 
setting, plot development, and the other basic elements of prose narrative. The first 
incarnation of BRUTUS took eight years to develop. Its designers concentrated on 
equipping the programme with the ability to write stories centred around the theme of 
betrayal, since this was one aspect of human experience that, they reasoned, could be 
logically tabulated, in contrast to more diffuse emotional phenomena such as love, 
fear, or regret. One of BRUTUS’ stories, entitled simply ‘Betrayal’, begins like this: 
 
Dave Striver loved the university. He loved its ivy-covered clocktowers, its 
ancient and sturdy brick, and its sun-splashed verdant greens and eager youth. 
He also loved the fact that the university is free of the stark unforgiving trials of 
the business world – only this isn’t a fact: academia has its own tests, and some 
are as merciless as any in the marketplace. A prime example is the dissertation 
defense: to earn the PhD, to become a doctor, one must pass an oral 
examination on one’s dissertation. This was a test Professor Edward Hart 
enjoyed giving.
xxiv
  
 
 Literature generators such as the Cybernetic Poet and BRUTUS invite 
comparison with an avant-garde tradition of ‘machine writing’ that extends back to 
the beginning of the twentieth century. As Brian McHale demonstrates in an 
important recent survey, this tradition encompasses such varied innovations as the 
procedural compositional techniques employed by Raymond Roussel, the literary 
‘games’ developed by the Surrealists, the cut-up strategies pioneered by the Dadaists 
and later adopted by William Burroughs, the author-computer collaborations 
undertaken by Charles O. Hartman, and the aleatory and/or arbitrarily rule-bound 
methods pursued by Louis Zukofsky, Jackson Mac Low, the Language poets, and the 
OuLiPo circle. While only a few of these figures and movements utilize actual 
machines, their texts are all examples of machine writing in the sense of that they are 
‘not “freely” composed but produced by the operation of mechanical techniques for 
generating and/or manipulating bits of language’.xxv McHale argues that these texts 
can be best compared to one another ‘in terms of the relative proportions of writer to 
machine participation in the composition of the text’.xxvi All literature, he argues, 
possesses a mechanical element to the extent that it imposes constraints of form, 
genre, length – and, specifically in the case of poetry, rhyme and metre – on the 
expressive capacity of the author.
xxvii
 The spectrum of machine writing as such, 
however, ranges from texts in which a set of more-or-less mechanically produced 
materials are submitted to heavy postprocessing on the part of the writer (as in the 
novels of Raymond Roussel), through to the practice of a figure such as Jackson Mac 
Low, which entirely delegates the outcome of a particular procedure or programme, 
and even in certain instances the choice of the procedure itself, to mechanical 
permutation.
xxviii
 Kurzweil’s and Bringsjord and Ferrucci’s generators would find 
themselves at the latter pole of McHale’s typological scale: they produce their texts 
within certain pre-programmed parameters, but the process is not otherwise subject to 
human intervention or interference. While avant-gardist utilizations of mechanical 
techniques consistently present themselves as strategic subversions of the 
autonomous, expressive author who looms so large in Romantic and post-Romantic 
aesthetic ideology, however, the Cybernetic Poet and BRUTUS projects seemingly 
aspire to endow the machine itself with those very qualities of sovereignty and 
creative genius. Tellingly, Kurzweil has a clear preference for poets in the Romantic 
tradition, including Keats and Whitman, as well as Blake, Byron, and Shelley (though 
the relation of his own mechanical poet to these titans is, of course, purely imitative). 
Bringsjord and Ferrucci, meanwhile, identify the benchmark of creativity with such 
giants of the canon as Dickens, Tolstoy, Joyce, Updike, and Morrison (whilst 
acknowledging that ‘if BRUTUSn, some refined descendant of BRUTUS1, is to soon 
find employment at the expense of a human writer, in all likelihood it will be as an 
author of formulaic romance and mystery’xxix). 
 Regardless of the shortcomings of these programmes with respect to their 
designers’ highest ambitions, and whatever we might think of the aesthetic qualities 
of the writings they produce, it is undeniable that their texts bear at least a passable 
resemblance to the literary forms they are designed to emulate. As Kathleen L. Komar 
says of a piece by Kurzweil’s poet, ‘if we did not know this [the text’s mechanical 
provenance], we would undoubtedly count the poem as literature’.xxx What is equally 
clear, however (and what I take to be the grounds for Komar’s equivocation), is that 
these programmes remain entirely bound by the problem of intentionality: they may 
be able to follow rules in such a way as to produce texts that meet the objective 
criteria for recognition as works of poetry or short fiction, but they have no 
apprehension of what these texts mean, or even that they could yield such a thing as 
meaning. The successes and failures of these projects are cast into sharp relief by two 
celebrated intellectual experiments, which are often hailed as inaugurating, 
respectively, the disciplines of artificial intelligence and modern literary theory: the 
eponymous test invented by the computer scientist Alan Turing to determine the 
existence of machine intelligence, and the experiment in literary response undertaken 
by the critic I.A. Richards under the banner of ‘practical criticism’. 
 The ‘Turing Test’, first described in the seminal paper ‘Computing Machinery 
and Intelligence’ (1950), consists of a scenario in which a human interrogator poses 
questions to two concealed interlocutors in an attempt to determine which is a human 
and which a machine; if the machine can persuade the interrogator that it is the human 
party, Turing reasoned, then it can be legitimately deemed intelligent. Both the 
Cybernetic Poet and BRUTUS have been submitted to variations on the Turing Test, 
in which readers attempted to distinguish the programmes’ texts from those by human 
writers.
xxxi
 The thirteen adults and three children to whom Kurzweil administered his 
test correctly attributed the poems they read at a rate of 63 per cent and 48 per cent, 
respectively.
xxxii
 Meanwhile, 25 per cent of the two thousand web visitors who read a 
piece by BRUTUS alongside four stories by human writers successfully identified the 
machine-authored text.
xxxiii
 The fact that in these (albeit only semi-scientific) tests 
readers succeeded in distinguishing between human- and computer-generated writings 
at a rate not significantly better than chance lends empirical weight to the assertion 
that the two programmes are capable of imitating the conventions of their assigned 
genres with a considerable degree of credibility. Paradoxically, however, when the 
products of these programmes are considered in light of an experiment that insists on 
curbing considerations of authorial identity in favour of concentrated interpretation of 
the texts themselves, the irrevocable alterity of their computational origins – 
seemingly elided in these quasi-Turing Tests – reasserts itself. 
 I.A. Richards’ Practical Criticism (1929) describes an initiative undertaken at 
Cambridge University in the 1920s, whereby groups of readers, predominantly 
undergraduates studying English, were issued with poems by a range of authors – 
contemporary, canonical, and minor – which had been stripped of personally and 
historically identifying details; the readers were invited to submit written responses or 
‘protocols’ in which they recorded their reflections on these materials. Richards’ 
realisation, on the basis of these often misconceived submissions, that literary 
criticism needed to develop a considerably more rigorous and systematic 
methodology prepared the ground for many of the theoretical innovations of the 
succeeding decades. His pedagogical exclusion of biographical and historical data so 
as to focus the reader’s attention on the words on the page would prove to be 
particularly significant for the Anglo-American New Critics of the 1940s and ’50s. Its 
influence is notably discernible in William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley’s 
famous refutation of the so-called intentional fallacy on the grounds that ‘the design 
or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging 
the success of a work of literary art’.xxxiv Despite the very different intellectual 
coordinates of the two traditions, affinities can also be detected between the vision of 
the text as an autonomous artefact pioneered by Richards and formalized by the New 
Critics and the radical anti-authorialism and anti-intentionalism of certain strands of 
French poststructuralist theory, positions most vividly articulated in Roland Barthes’ 
notorious 1967 essay ‘The Death of the Author’. There are, for example, clear 
resonances with Wimsatt and Beardsley in Barthes’ claim that in traditional criticism 
‘the explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as 
if it were always in the end … the voice of a single person, the author “confiding” in 
us’.xxxv Similarly, like the New Critics, Barthes is not only resistant to critical 
methods that seek to ground meaning in the figure of the author, but also to those 
which appeal to the author’s ‘hypostases’: namely, ‘society, history, psyche, liberty’, 
entities which are imagined as dwelling ‘beneath the work’ and which, once ‘found’, 
explain it.
xxxvi
 
 The most significant challenge to the New Critical and poststructuralist 
assaults on authorial intention came in 1982 with Steven Knapp and Walter Benn 
Michaels’ polemical essay ‘Against Theory’. Knapp and Michaels argue that meaning 
is inextricable from intention: however much material marks may resemble familiar 
textual signifiers, they cannot be understood as meaningful unless they are 
intentionally inscribed. They invite the reader to imagine encountering what appear to 
be lines of poetry etched on the beach: if we count these marks ‘as nonintentional 
effects of mechanical processes (erosion, percolation, etc.)’ then to treat them as 
meaningful would be an invalid projection of agency onto merely contingent 
phenomena.
xxxvii
 On the basis of this argument, Knapp and Michaels make the bold 
claim that since there can be no meaning without intention, ‘the meaning of a text is 
simply identical to the author’s intended meaning’.xxxviii Given this, ‘theory’ – by 
which they mean ‘the attempt to govern interpretations of particular texts by 
appealing to an account of interpretation in general’ – is a misguided enterprise that 
should be abandoned. Though few scholars have been willing to accept Knapp and 
Michaels’ arguments wholesale, it is nonetheless apparent in retrospect that, as Reed 
Way Dasenbrock remarks, ‘“Against Theory” and the controversy it generated helped 
usher in the “post-theoretical” era we now seem to be in’xxxix – ‘post-theoretical’ to 
the extent, at least, that debates over the appropriate hermeneutic or interpretive 
protocols for textual analysis no longer have the centrality in critical practice that they 
once had. In their wake, the prevailing tendency has been away from a text-centred 
focus on the disentanglement of meaning and towards a re-embedding of those 
meanings within the kind of extra-textual fields that the New Criticism and the ‘high 
theory’ of poststructuralism both, in their different ways, sought to bracket out. A 
return to history, materiality, referentiality, the experiential, the bodily, and the real is 
evident across an array of recently emergent or re-invigorated critical movements, 
ranging from new historicism and cultural materialism to Marxism, postcolonialism, 
feminism, queer theory, trauma studies, and ecocriticism. Michaels, in particular, has 
made significant contributions to this contextual or historicist turn in literary studies 
(most notably his major new historicist work The Gold Standard and the Logic of 
Naturalism [1987]), but if the ‘After Theory’ controversy played a part in paving the 
way for this shift, it did so more through its challenge to the dominance of a critical 
paradigm whose interests tended to exclude extra-textual concerns than through any 
positive endorsement of those concerns themselves; indeed, Knapp and Michaels 
insist that they make no claims at all ‘about what should count as evidence for 
determining the content of any particular intention’ (intention for them, of course, 
being synonymous with meaning).
xl
 Unexpectedly, the field of embodied cognition – 
and, more distantly, the clockwork writing automata that so suggestively anticipate its 
interests – indicate ways in which the argument of ‘After Theory’ might be extended 
and modified so as to establish a compelling ontological legitimation for the expanded 
horizons of recent critical study. 
The grounds for this legitimation begin to become clear when one considers 
how a successor of one of Richards’ students might respond if asked to write a 
‘protocol’ on a suitably anonymized text by the Cybernetic Poet or BRUTUS. The 
reader would no doubt be able to give some account of the basic, literal sense of the 
piece, and might also succeed in tracing some credible patterns of imagery or paths of 
thematic development, but, once informed of its origins, they would be likely to feel 
that the exercise had been in some way profoundly futile. As P.D. Juhl observes, there 
is ‘something odd about interpreting’ a ‘computer poem’.xli Accordingly, McHale 
describes the ‘resentment’ that ‘anyone who has introduced [interactive, machine-
mediated, or machine-generated] poetry to students knows’.xlii Insofar as the function 
of such avant-gardist strategies is precisely to challenge the reduction of literary 
reception to a pure matter of determining meaning, McHale’s implicit impatience 
with his students is understandable enough, but, equally, if the urge to decipher 
familiar, apparently intelligible signs is not simply a convention of certain forms of 
literary training but an integral element of our very species-being, then the students’ 
resentment is equally excusable. Indeed, to return to the hypothetical example of an 
exercise in practical criticism being performed on a machine-generated text, the 
reader’s response – which is in this case wholly predicated on the establishment of 
meaning – would not only feel futile, but would be futile, since it would consist of a 
mere encounter with the ‘nonintentional effects of mechanical processes’,xliii from 
which it is as perverse to read off meaning as it is instinctive to do so. 
The Cybernetic Poet, BRUTUS, and other highly ‘delegated’ systems of 
machine writing truly are hypostases of Barthes’ dead author: thoughtless, affectless, 
intentionless beings whose arbitrary manipulations of ‘tissue[s] of quotations drawn 
from the innumerable centres of culture’ function, as if by magic, to drain these 
textual fragments of their significatory power.
xliv
 All that remains for their readers is 
the possibility of a delirious dérive across the smooth surface of the text, in pursuit 
not of interpretation or decipherment,
xlv
 but of the sheer overwhelming jouissance 
evoked by the material signifier in its all geometric splendour. Despite the best efforts 
of Barthes and others – including, most notably, Susan Sontag and Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari
xlvi
 – the notion of a genuinely non-interpretive aesthetics remains less a 
critical programme, however, than an intriguing thought experiment, one which has in 
fact only served to demonstrate the inherently interpretive character of every critical 
statement.  
Meaning, then, is the uncircumventable object of reading, and meaning, as we 
have seen, can be guaranteed only by the agency of an intentional being. Of course, 
the Cybernetic Poet’s ‘Soul’, BRUTUS’ ‘Betrayal’, or Jackson Mac Low’s ‘Call Me 
Ishmael’ were not, as in Knapp and Michaels’ example, engraved on the beach by 
some cosmically improbable accident. They each originated, instead, in the actions of 
a programmer or designer, who presumably had some understanding of the rules and 
symbols he or she selected for mechanical processing, and some aspiration that, once 
initiated, the programme would combine these materials in such a way as to produce 
textual outputs intelligible to a human reader. As Kathleen L. Komar remarks with 
regard to the Cybernetic Poet, ‘the initial reading experience’ of Kurzweil and his 
programming colleagues ‘informs the programs they write to create new texts that 
will produce a similar experience for the reader’.xlvii A marginal degree of 
intentionality, and thus of meaning, can be recuperated in these instances, therefore, 
but only by appealing to the human agent or agents without whose initiating role no 
such texts would exist. Why is it, then, that writings by John Donne, Edna St. Vincent 
Millay, or the Reverend G.A. Studdert Kennedy, which I.A. Richards invited his 
Cambridge classes to respond to in the 1920s, enjoy an intentional and semantic 
plenitude inevitably withheld from the algorithmically-generated text, or available 
only to the extent that it is guaranteed by the activity of a human programmer? The 
answer – as the clockwork automata of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries long 
ago hinted, and as artificial intelligence has recently demonstrated – is that 
intentionality can arise only from embodied existence in the referential realm of 
material objects and relations.
xlviii
 Wordsworth thus thematizes the very ontological 
conditions of possibility of his own poetry when, in ‘Tintern Abbey’, he strives to 
summon a vision of his younger self driven by presymbolic, animalistic impulsions to 
range across the as yet undifferentiated world of phenomena: 
 
changed, no doubt, from what I was, when first 
I came among these hills; when like a roe 
I bounded o’er the mountains, by the sides 
Of the deep rivers, and the lonely streams, 
Wherever nature led; 
……………………………………………. 
For nature then 
(The coarser pleasures of my boyish days, 
And their glad animal movements all gone by,) 
To me was all in all. – I cannot paint 
What then I was. The sounding cataract 
Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock, 
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood, 
Their colours and their forms, were then to me 
An appetite: a feeling and a love, 
That had no need of a remoter charm, 
By thought supplied, or any interest 
Unborrowed from the eye. – That time is past. (67-71; 73-84) 
 
To quote Jacques Lacan, it is only from this organic, infantile union with the ‘the 
entirety of things, ... the totality of the real’ that the speaker’s capacity for linguistic 
reflection on his condition can emerge, inscribing ‘on the plane of the real this other 
plane, which we here call the plane of the symbolic’.xlix 
Those modes of literary analysis that attempt to separate literary texts out from 
the spatio-temporal manifold in which they are situated therefore paradoxically 
exclude the very phenomena that make meaning, and thus criticism itself, possible. 
This being so, the incorporation of these phenomena – whether they be, say, a soaring 
rock formation,  a ruined religious building, the scars carved on the landscape by the 
rhythms of industrialization, or the violent upheavals on the streets of revolutionary 
Paris – into our reflections on literary meaning becomes less a matter of preference 
than of necessity. The state of embodied intentionality that subtends literary meaning 
demands, then, a wider consideration of the world through and in which this state 
develops; but the overdetermined nature of the subject’s worldlihood rules out any 
endorsement of Knapp and Michaels’ claim (in the face of the anti-intentionalism of 
the New Criticism and poststructuralism) that the ‘the meaning of a text is simply 
identical to the author’s intended meaning’.l If the embeddedness of the human 
subject in the material conditions of life on earth permits the emergence of its 
capacity for meaning-making, then, in a recursive movement, it is the privileged 
manifestation of this capacity – literature – that most powerfully crystallizes these 
more-or-less contingent and impersonal conditions into meaningful, symbolic form. 
Such is the virtually infinite variety of these conditions, however, that this 
intervention on the part of the writer constitutes the coming into being of a field of 
semantic potential in which meaning may be almost inexhaustibly sought and found. 
The literary act is the performative announcement of an intention to mean, not the 
inscription of a singular intended meaning. 
 
Prolegomenon to a Robot Literary History 
Two days after Geoffrey Jefferson delivered the Lister Oration quoted at the 
beginning of this essay, in which he cast doubt on the likelihood of a machine ever 
genuinely replicating the human composition of a sonnet, his colleague at the 
University of Manchester, Alan Turing, was quoted in The Times as saying, 
 
I do not see why it [a computer at the University] should not enter any one of 
the fields normally covered by the human intellect, and eventually compete on 
equal terms. I do not think you can even draw the line about sonnets though the 
comparison is perhaps a little bit unfair because a sonnet written by a machine 
will be better appreciated by another machine.
li
 
 
By the late 1980s, rudimentary computer-generated poetry was well established. In an 
essay on a notable early programme, RACTER, Christian Bök speculates that ‘the 
poets of tomorrow are likely to resemble programmers, exalted, not because they can 
write great poems, but because they can build a small drone out of words to write 
great poems for us’. He continues: ‘What have we to lose by writing poetry for a 
robotic culture that must inevitably succeed our own?... We may have to consider this 
heretofore unimagined, but nevertheless prohibited, option: writing poetry for 
inhuman readers, who do not yet exist, because such aliens, clones, or robots have not 
yet evolved to read it’.lii Casting an eye towards this far future, Michael L. Johnson 
wonders, ‘what forms beyond the human could evolve, what new kinds of difficult 
beauty?... The rise of silicon “life”, silicon intelligence: a Promethean act of 
technology and language. One may imagine silicon entities floating through deep 
space, manipulating signifiers beyond human ken’.liii 
 The perspective posited in these quotations is articulated at length by Manuel 
De Landa in his extraordinary book War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (1991), 
which invites us to imagine a future class of 
 
specialized ‘robot historians’ committed to tracing the various technological 
lineages that gave rise to their species. And we could further imagine that such a 
robot historian would write a different kind of history than would its human 
counterpart.... The robot historian ... would hardly be bothered by the fact that it 
was a human who put the first motor together: for the role of humans would be 
seen as little more than that of industrious insects pollinating an independent 
species of machine-flowers that simply did not possess its own reproductive 
organs during a segment of its evolution.
liv
  
 
As the remarks by Turing, Bök, and Johnson suggest, a robot literary history would 
likely see human beings and their aesthetic interests as similarly marginal to its 
narrative. What seems increasingly clear, however, is that information processing 
machines will only conceivably develop the sentience necessary for a literary culture 
of their own by escaping the prison of nonintentionality; and their only possibility of 
achieving this is by emulating humans to the extent, at least, of ceasing to dwell in 
grey boxes on laboratory desks, and emerging, instead, as embodied creatures free to 
explore the world they inhabit. Any such literary history would no doubt reserve 
privileged chapters for the clockwork writers of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, whose embodied forms so strikingly anticipate those of their 
robotic descendents, as well as the literature generators of our own present, which 
demonstrate the limits of an existing paradigm, and the necessity of new departures. 
Both moments also (although, of course, from our robot historian’s perspective 
merely incidentally) cast new light on some central questions in what we will have to 
learn to call human literary history. 
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